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PPR remains a major challenge to smallholder farmers in Mali. To understand the drivers
of low adoption of vaccination by farmers, we analyzed the socio-economic factors
influencing farmer WTV during and in the absence of vaccination campaigns. Given that
the costs associated with vaccination are largely borne by farmers, we assessed factors
that associated with farmer willingness to pay (WTP) more than the current price (150
XOF per dose) by considering two attributes of improvement of the vaccines empirically
highlighted as potential leverage points for intervention: access of farmers to vaccines
(reducing the distance to the vaccine) and availability of information about the quality
of the vaccine (introducing a vaccine viability detector). Data were collected in Mopti
and Sikasso regions from 304 producers. Overall (n = 304), 89 percent of respondents
vaccinated their herds during official vaccination campaigns. They are associated with
receiving information on the campaign calendar more quickly if information is relayed
at places of worship and if they have an awareness of the benefits of vaccination,
including the protection of third parties. Only 39 percent of respondents vaccinate
outside vaccination campaigns. They are positively linked to the credibility of private
veterinarians and a recognition of the vital importance of vaccines but are negatively
associated with ignorance of vaccination needs and concern about vaccine side-effects.
Both distance-effects and quality-tracker effects are associated with farmer willingness to
pay more than the current vaccine prices. Farmers practicing semi-intensive production
systems are willing to pay 20 percent more than the current vaccine prices, as are users
who believe in the beneficial effects of vaccination, users who consider the prices of
vaccines as fair, and those who believe that some vaccines are more important than
others. Factors that discourage producers from vaccinating or from paying more for
vaccination would be more effectively managed with better communication on vaccine
benefits through targeted information dissemination campaigns by Malian authorities.
Greater price transparency throughout the vaccine production and deployment chain is
critical, while timely availability of vaccine tested for viability would increase the willingness
to vaccinate while improving access.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Livestock plays a critical role in Mali’s economy. It represents
25% of the GDP of the primary sector and 11% of the national
GDP. Livestock farming is the main source of income for over
30% of the population (1). At least 85% of rural households own
domestic ruminants, with small ruminants (SR) representing a
significant part of the livestock sector having ∼40 million heads
in 2016 (2). SR keeping provides readily available cash in the
face of family needs, a source of livelihoods, medium-term assets,
protein for daily meals, and socio-cultural functions. However,
the multifunctional role of SR is threatened by the high burden
of diseases, such as Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR).
The principal method of control for PPR is vaccination which
is reflected in the Global Control and Eradication Strategy for
PPR1. There are many vaccines that are commercially available
and have shown to be effective for at least 3 years post-vaccination
(3, 4). However, most of them require the application of a strict
cold chain during their deployment in the field. It is important
that all SR are vaccinated because introduction of unvaccinated
animals into a naïve population presents a high risk. Thus, the
PPR Global Control and Eradication Strategy recommends at
least 80% of vaccination coverage for SR above 3 months old (5).
Despite heavy investment of the public veterinary services
of Mali in vaccination campaigns against PPR, countrywide
vaccination coverage for SR is very low at just 7% (6).
Nonetheless, demand exists for PPR vaccines, especially where
innovative delivery mechanisms can be deployed. For instance,
reports from ongoing development projects showed that
up to 55% vaccination coverage in specific communes of
the regions of Sikasso and Mopti (7) is possible using
participatory approaches through Innovation Platforms to
increase stakeholder participation in vaccination. However, there
are many challenges encountered by stakeholders in the process
of vaccination in Mali. First, private veterinarians still complain
of unfair competition from State veterinarians in properly
carrying out vaccination. Furthermore, vaccine delivery systems
are often not very effective in reaching all SR livestock producers,
particularly women, due to logistical problems caused by poor
infrastructure, such as roads to reach remote villages and the
absence of vaccination parks for SR. In addition, the cost
of vaccination in Mali is largely borne by livestock farmers,
constituting a barrier to participation given that not all livestock
producers can afford it and some livestock producers do not
feel there is enough benefit from investing in vaccination. Some
stakeholders argue that the limited participation of livestock
farmers in vaccination is not caused by the perceived high cost
of vaccination, but rather poor access to good quality vaccines,
together with a lack of awareness about timing of vaccination
campaigns (6, 8). The maintenance of the cold chain throughout
the vaccine delivery might also be a constraint.
The objective of this study was to assess farmer perceptions
about vaccination of SR livestock, with particular emphasis on
their willingness to vaccinate (WTV) and willingness to pay
1http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-detail/en/c/
282777/
for vaccination (WTP). For the WTP, as already highlighted by
Dione et al. (9) and Sadio (8), we considered the delivery of the
vaccines at the closest area of residency (termed “distance-effect”)
to facilitate accessibility and improved information on the quality
of the vaccine (termed “quality tracker-effect” by introducing a
vaccine viability detector2).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Literature Review and Theoretical
Framework
Decisions for vaccination, whether human or livestock, can often
be more associated with religious and spiritual reasons, personal
opinions, safety worries and additional information, beyond any
knowledge of risks, costs, and benefits (10, 11).
Through a qualitative study, Abakar et al. (11) identified
a number of demand-side barriers to vaccination, including
mistrust of vaccination programmes/services and health system
issues, among mobile pastoralists in Chad. Given the singular
relationships of Sub-Saharan pastoralists to their herds (12), it
seems reasonable that vaccination hesitancy and refusal might
be an issue for immunization operations against animal diseases.
Once the decision to vaccinate is taken, and given vaccination
is not free in Mali, it would be important to better understand
the root causes or drivers of individual decisions to pay for
vaccination services.
One approach to gaining such understanding is through the
concept of willingness to pay, which is defined as the maximum
price a consumer accepts to pay for a product or a service (13–16).
There are two main ways to measure the willingness to
pay. The first approach, based on revealed preference and
pioneered by Samuelson (17), holds that consumer preferences
can be expressed through what they purchase under different
incomes and prices. This perspective represents evidence-based
choices from market data and various types of experiments
(laboratory and field experiments or auctions). The second
approach is based on stated preference which tries to determine
the total economic value by incorporating both non-use value
and option value through contingent valuation, conjoint analysis
or contingent choice methods. Derived from direct and indirect
surveys, the stated preference approach has been popularized
by studies of the willingness to vaccinate or to pay for
vaccines against human diseases (18–24) and recently against
animal diseases (25).
With regard to animal diseases, there is limited evidence
describing the decision-making behind the vaccination of
livestock. Elbers et al. (26) highlighted economic and social-
psychological factors behind farmers’ motivations to participate
in a voluntary vaccination programme as well as their
perceived need to actively be a part of the eradication
campaign. Sok et al. (27–29) and Gethmann et al. (30)
discussed the motivations, barriers, and willingness to vaccinate
2Producers sometimes have a little trouble judging the quality of a vaccine. Some
still use observations (such as the texture of the product) to get an idea of
the quality and decide whether or not to vaccinate. Having a detector that can
immediately show whether the vaccine is good or not could greatly help.
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FIGURE 1 | Vaccination behaviors and measurement methods of consumer’s willingness to pay.
against bluetongue disease, while Bennett and Balcombe (31)
investigated farmers’ willingness to pay for a bovine tuberculosis
(bTB) vaccine. These studies, however, focused on animal
diseases in Europe. Their findings may be different to the
situation of West African countries where vaccine coverage
is low, health delivery systems insufficiently meet current
needs, and effective communication approaches and tools are
lacking (Figure 1).
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Map 1 | Localization of the study areas in Mali (in blue).
Methodology and Data
Objectives
Our overall objective is to assess the willingness of Malian
livestock farmers to vaccinate (WTV) and their willingness to
pay (WTP) for improved attributes of vaccines against PPR for
SR. Two contingent concepts were analyzed separately, as some
factors may affectWTV but notWTP for various reasons, such as
farmer belief about the unfairness of vaccine pricingmechanisms.
Therefore, we address two main questions:
i. For the WTV model: What are the socio-economic
determinants of the attitude of livestock farmers regarding
vaccination against PPR, i.e., in terms of choosing to vaccinate
or not?
ii. For the WTP model: What are the socio-economic
determinants associated with the farmer willingness to
pay more than the current price for improved accessibility to
the PPR vaccine (distance-effect) and quality of the vaccine
(quality-tracker effect)?3
Survey Tool
A questionnaire (see Appendix) was designed to collect
data on household demographic characteristics, Production
systems, vaccination knowledge and practices, constraints
3Intuitively, it is worth bearing in mind that attributes that are to be focused on in
the WTP work would come from the WTV analysis that precedes it. In this study,
even though WTV is a sine qua non condition of WTP, we opted to test two key
criteria related to access to vaccines and the true or false perception of the quality
of vaccines.
of livestock producers to vaccination and farmer WTV
and WTP for vaccination, considering vaccine accessibility
and quality.
Sample Size
For our study, a sample was drawn from 4,254 producers who
were identified as Feed the Future—Mali Livestock Technology
Scaling (FTF-MLTS) program beneficiaries.We initially agreed to
work with amargin of error of 3–5%, a confidence interval of 95%
and a proportion of 50%. This involved selecting a sample size
between 352 and 1,265 producers. Finally, due to access issues
mainly related to insecurity4 and limited budget, 304 livestock
farmers keeping either SR only or SR and cattle were reached.
Among these livestock producers, 50%were fromMopti and 50%
from Sikasso region (Map 1).
Data Collection and Processing
The survey tool was designed on ODK (Open Data Kit) and
transferred to Samsung tablets for electronic capture. In each
region, trained field veterinarians and veterinary technicians
were recruited to administer the questionnaire to livestock
producers. The team leader of the field activities oversaw data
cleaning and quality assurance every day after the enumerators
returned from the field. Data was then uploaded to the server
and downloaded in Excel and statistical files for further cleaning
and analysis.
4Mali is facing increased security threats and a protracted political crisis.
This raises the security-risk level across the country and constraints interview-
based fieldwork.
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TABLE 1 | Description of variables used in the regression analyses.
Dependent
variables
Independent variables
(in order of appearance
in the paper)
Modalities of
independent variables
(in order of appearance
in the paper)
Willingness to
vaccinate
Yes = 1
No = 2
Information
availability/access of/to
vaccination campaign
Yes = 1
No = 2
Information channel
(multiple choices possible)
Radio = 1
Places of worship = 2
Town crier = 3
Word-of-mouth = 4
Benefit of vaccination Yes = 1
No = 2
Willingness to pay
for vaccination
No willingness to
pay more = 0
Willingness to pay
5% more = 1
Willingness to pay
10% more = 2
Willingness to pay
20% more = 3
Cattle vaccination frequency Every vaccination
campaign = 1
Every year = 2
Many years = 3
Never = 4
Vaccination protects others Disagree = 1
Moderately agree = 2
Agree = 3
Knowledge of vaccination
needs
Yes = 1
No = 2
Vaccination is vital for my
animals
Disagree = 1
Moderately agree = 2
Agree = 3
Private veterinarians
(mandataries) are credible
Disagree = 1
Moderately agree = 2
Agree = 3
Concerns about side-effects Disagree = 1
Moderately agree = 2
Agree = 3
Production system Intensive production = 1
Semi-intensive
production = 2
Extensive production = 3
Animal species vaccinated Cattle = 1
Sheep = 2
Goat = 3
Fairness of PPR vaccine
prices
Yes = 1
No = 2
Some vaccines better than
others
Yes = 1
No = 2
Participation to vaccination
campaign
Yes = 1
No = 2
The data were processed in several ways:
– For willingness to vaccinate (WTV): Two binary variables
were identified and used: (1) participation in vaccination
campaigns and (2) use of vaccination outside of vaccination
campaigns. To avoid overloading the analysis with a large
number of variables, a correlation analysis was carried out to
discriminate variables that have strong correlation with the
identified binary variables.
– For willingness to pay (WTP): Questions aboutWTP generated
multiple responses which we considered as polychotomous
dependent variables, requiring the use of a multinomial
logistic regression.
Correlation and multicollinearity analysis allowed
the identification of about fifteen independent variables for
the estimation of WTV and WTP. Detailed explanations of the
variables used in the regression analyses (described next) are
presented in Table 1.
Regression Analyses
We used a generic binary logistic regression analysis to better
capture the socioeconomic factors that are associated with
WTV and a multinomial logistic regression (Gologit model) to
analyze WTP.
Binary logistic regression reflects situations in which the
observed outcome for a dependent variable can have only two
possible categories. Our study onWTV deals with “To vaccinate”
vs. “Not to vaccinate.” For the multinomial logistic regression
approach, its use represents situations in which the outcome
can have three or more possible ordered or ranked responses.
Our study on WTP involves multiple responses, such as “Not
willing to pay a supplement,” or “Willing to pay a supplement
of 5%,” “Willing to pay a supplement of 10%,” or “Willing to pay
a supplement of 20%” for potential improvements in access to a
vaccine and information on the quality of the vaccine.
We can generalize the Gologit model used in this paper by
generalizing the bivariate logit model and considering an ordered
dependent variable taking jmodalities, written as:
yi
∗ = θ0 + θ1x1i + . . .+ θkxki + ei = ei
′θ + ei (1)
where x1 . . . xk are the regressors that influence y
∗, y∗i is latent,
and ei is the error term. As in the binomial case, the y
∗ modalities
would depend directly on the position of y∗ with respect to
different threshold parameters or cutoffs that demarcate the
boundaries of the various categories:
y =


1 if yi
∗ < c1
2 if c1 ≤ yi
∗ < c2
.
.
.
J if y∗i > cJ−1
By defining F as the function for distributing error terms that
follows a logistic law, we have:
Prob
(
yi = 1
)
= Prob
(
xi
′θ + ei < c1
)
= F
(
c1 − xi
′θ
)
(2)
Prob
(
yi = j
)
= Prob
(
cj−1 ≤ xi
′θ + ei < cj
)
= F
(
cj − xi
′θ
)
− F
(
cj−1 − xi
′θ
)
, 2 ≤ J ≤ J − 1(3)
Prob
(
yi = J
)
= Prob
(
xi
′θ + ei > cj
)
= 1− F (cj−1 − xi
′θ) (4)
The model coefficients θ are estimated by maximum
likelihood. In addition, it is essential to understand and
test an implicit hypothesis of this model, known as the parallel
regression hypothesis, for the ordered logit model, and the odds
proportion hypothesis (32–34).
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Equations (2–4) can be used to derive the cumulative
probabilities that are written in the simplified form by:
Prob
(
yi ≤ j
)
= F
(
cj − xi
′θ
)
, 1 ≤ j ≤ J − 1.
These last equations show that the ordered regression model
is equivalent to J − 1 binary regressions under the fundamental
assumption that estimated coefficients with respect to the
explanatory variables are identical in each of the equations.
In contrast to binary models, interpreting the coefficients of
an ordered model is complicated, especially for intermediate
modalities. To do so, we calculate the marginal effects of
variables on the probabilities (as in Equations 5–7) and
resort to the transformation of coefficients into odds ratios or
conditional probabilities.
∂Prob (yi = 1| xi)
∂xik
(5)
∂Prob (yi = j| xi)
∂xik
(6)
∂Prob (yi = J| xi)
∂xik
(7)
There are two ways to determine the overall marginal effects
on the sample: evaluate at mean data value or evaluate for each
observation and calculate the average of the individual marginal
effects in the sample. For large samples, both methods give
similar results. For our paper, we chose to calculate the marginal
effects in relation to the median individual.
When outcome variables are ordinal, the ordinal logit model
has been popularly used. However, some researchers, such
as Williams (33, 34) prefer to use the Generalized ordered
logit/partial proportional odds models (Gologit/ppo) as they
provide more robust results even if the interpretation of model
outcomes becomes more difficult. Therefore, Williams (33, 34)
writes the Gologit model as:
P
(
Yi > j
)
=
exp(θi + Xiβj)
1+
[
exp
(
θi + Xiβj
)] , with j = 1, 2, . . . ,M (8)
where M is the number of categories of the ordinal
dependent variable.
Finally, the probabilities that Y will take on each of the values
1, 2, . . . ,M can be determinated by:
P (Yi = 1) = 1− g (Xiβ1) (9)
P
(
Yi = j
)
= g
(
Xiβj−1
)
− g
(
Xiβj
)
with j = 2, . . . ,M − 1 (10)
P (Yi = M) = g (XiβM−1) (11)
Depending on the values of M, it would be possible to have an
equivalent of a logistic regression model (M = 2), or a series of
binary logistic regressions (M > 2).
Context and Study Area
Livestock vaccination is run through public-private partnership.
It is mainly carried out by established private veterinarians called
“mandataires” (or mandataries) under the supervision of the
public veterinary services except in areas where these public
veterinary services are not established. In high insecurity regions,
vaccination is provided free of charge by the government or some
development organizations. In contrast, private veterinarians
fully recover the cost of vaccination from farmers. Every year,
official vaccination campaigns for livestock are launched by the
Government in early October and will last to March. However,
given random sources of funding and mobility of livestock
keepers, farmers who miss this vaccination campaigns can
get their animals vaccinated by available veterinarians in their
communities at any time of the year; this is referred to as “outside
vaccination campaigns.”
The FTF-MLTS program seeks to contribute to the inclusive
growth of the ruminant livestock value chains for increased
income, food and nutrition security for 266,000 cattle, sheep,
and goat keepers and other value chains actors in three regions
in the country (Mopti, Timbuktu and Sikasso), as a means of
lifting them out of poverty. Supported by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of the
US government’s Feed the Future initiative, the program sets out
to bridge ruminant livestock productivity gaps and to enhance
the volume and value of ruminant livestock marketed through
a wide-scale dissemination of proven livestock technologies
and best practices. The FTF-MLTS program has made priority
investments in designing and rolling out innovative approaches
to increase vaccination coverage of SR and cattle against PPR and
Contagious Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia (CBPP), respectively and
bovine/ovine pasteurellosis (7).
RESULTS
Contingent valuation methods for eliciting preferences for non-
marketed goods are useful in addressing actor WTP. In this
survey, we first asked farmers if they are willing to pay 20% more
than the current PPR vaccine price, then 10% more and finally
5% more if the health services were delivered at the closest area
of residency (distance-effect) to facilitate accessibility. The same
questions were asked for improved information about the quality
of the vaccine (quality-tracker effect).
Almost all livestock producers (96%) perceive tangible benefits
of vaccines for herd size, as they expect fewer animal losses.
However, while 44% of them are not aware that vaccinating
their herds can also protect those of others, 29% thought that
vaccination is required only during outbreaks, and 24% believed
that vaccination serves to fatten animals.
Regression Analysis Results for the
Willingness to Vaccinate (WTV)
Almost 89% of the 304 respondents vaccinate their herds
during the vaccination campaigns formally organized by public
authorities while 11% of them did not vaccinate. Outside formal
vaccination campaigns, only 39% of respondents vaccinate their
herds while 61% stated that they did not vaccinate outside the
period of organized campaigns (Table 2).
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Factors Associated With the WTV During Vaccination
Campaigns
WTVduring vaccination campaigns was found to be significantly
associated with the availability, access and attributes of
information provided about the vaccination campaigns (Table 3).
Given the prominent place of religions in Mali, places of
worship play an important role for information sharing. Through
them, information on vaccination campaigns is more effective
in incentivizing actors to vaccinate their animals. Previous
experiences with cattle vaccination could, however, constraint
the care of small ruminants as this factor is negatively associated
with the WTV. For an equivalent price per dose of vaccine, there
seems to be a trade-off between the different species to protect.
The respective odds ratio of each of these attributes, however,
is relatively small, implying a limited effect on the probability of
participating in vaccination campaigns.
In Malian rural areas, scrutiny and judgment of community
members are important social values that reinforce peer effects.
Recognition that vaccinating can help to protect herds other than
TABLE 2 | Distribution of farmers’ responses on vaccination participation.
Variable Modalities Numbers %
Vaccination campaign Yes: 1 272 89.474
No: 2 32 10.526
Outside the vaccination campaign Yes: 1 119 39.145
No: 2 185 60.855
those owned by themselves constitutes an important incentive
for vaccination. With regard to the potential impacts on third
parties, the farmers who agree that vaccination protects their
herds have aWTV that is 129.4 timesmore often than the farmers
who disagree.
Factors Associated With the WTV Outside
Vaccination Campaigns
Even though only 39% of respondents claim to vaccinate their
flocks outside of official vaccination campaigns, we observe
that lack of knowledge about vaccination needs (different from
vaccination benefits) and concerns about side-effects discourage
actors from vaccinating (Table 4). This may be due to the
presence of less experienced or non-trained technicians handling
vaccination outside of official campaigns, leading to a greater
incidence of side effects due to poor vaccination techniques. On
the other hand, the credibility of private veterinarians (referred
to as the variable “Mandataries are credible”) and the recognition
of the vital importance of the vaccines were all shown to have a
positive effect on their WTV. The strong odds ratios indicate that
farmers who moderately and fully agree that vaccination is vital
have a WTV that is 243 to 262 time higher compared to farmers
who disagree (Table 4).
Regression Analysis Results for
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Vaccination
We recoded the variables and created new ones to allow their
use in an ordered logit regression: Distv and Qv were the
TABLE 3 | Factors associated with the WTV during vaccination campaigns.
Logistic regression LR chi2(10) = 155.38
Number of observations = 304 Log likelihood = −24.606224
LR chi2(10) = 155.38 Pseudo R2 = 0.7595
Variables Coefficient Odds Ratio 95% confidence interval P-value
Information availability/access Yes*
No −4.8 0.008 0.0008 0.0874 <0.001
Information channel Radio*
Places of worship 2.7 0.070 0.0043 1.1342 0.061
Town crier 1.0 0.364 0.0277 4.7699 0.441
Word-of-mouth 0.7 0.506 0.0513 4.9889 0.560
Benefit of vaccination Yes*
No −2.3 0.102 0.0147 0.7134 0.021
Cattle vaccination frequency Every vaccination campaign*
Every year −4.1 0.016 0.0012 0.2357 0.002
Many years −5.7 0.003 0.00005 0.2184 0.007
Never −4.3 0.014 0.0006 0.3557 0.010
Vaccination protects others Disagree*
Moderately agree 0.8 2.279 0.1125 46.1685 0.591
Agree 4.9 129.431 1.1750 14257.18** 0.043
A common practice would consist to fuse the reference category with the other levels of the variable that are not significantly different from the reference category. We proceed to
these supplemental analyses but this process did not give conclusive results. For the “Information channel” variable, the new reference category resulted from the regrouping provided
p-values of 0.868 and 0.771 for the odds ratios.
*Reference category.
**Abnormally wide confidence interval can raise with small sample size or when some variables have several categories with small frequencies.
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TABLE 4 | Factors influencing the WTV outside the vaccination campaigns.
Logistic regression
Number of observations = 304 Prob > chi2 = 0.000
LR chi2-11 = 78.37 Pseudo R2 = 0.1926
Variables Coefficient Odds ratio 95% confidence interval P-value
Information channel Radio*
Places of worship 0.1 0.9 0.2 3.9 0.936
Town crier 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.038
Word-of-mouth 0.9 0.4 0.1 1.2 0.106
Knowledge of vaccination needs Yes*
No −1.0 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.006
Vaccination is vital for my animals Disagree*
Moderately agree 5.5 243.3 10.8 5,477.8** 0.001
Agree 5.6 261.8 14.6 4,689.0** <0.001
Private veterinarians (mandataries) are credible Disagree*
Moderately agree 1.3 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.080
Agree 2.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.002
Concerns about side-effects Disagree*
Moderately agree −2.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 <0.001
Agree −1.2 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.004
*Reference category.
**Abnormally wide confidence interval can raise with small sample size or when some variables have several categories with small frequencies.
TABLE 5 | Distribution of dependent variables on the WTP for distance and
quality parameters.
Distv Freq. Percent Cum. Qv Freq. Percent Cum.
0 43 14.14 14.14 0 39 12.83 12.83
1 11 3.62 17.76 1 9 2.96 15.79
2 40 13.16 30.92 2 38 12.50 28.29
3 210 69.08 100.00 3 218 71.71 100.00
Total 304 100.00 Total 304 100.00
variables measuring the willingness to pay a premium for vaccine
delivery to be significantly shortened and for a quality-tracker
to be implemented on the vaccine packages, respectively. Their
modalities are: “1” if the farmer is willing to pay 5% more on
the current price of the vaccine; “2” if he/she is willing to pay
10% more; “3” if he/she is willing to pay 20% more and “0”
if he/she refuses all three options and therefore does not want
to pay anything more on the price of the vaccine. From field
investigations, a large majority of farmers (69% and 71%) say
they are willing to pay 20% more than the current price of the
dose of PPR vaccine if, respectively, the delivery distance and
quality-tracking of the vaccines are improved (Table 5). It should
be noted that between 13 and 14% of farmers say they are not
prepared to pay more regardless of the improvement made in the
delivery and quality-tracking of vaccines, respectively.
A generalized ordered logit (Gologit) model was used
to address shortcomings of the ordered logit model and
parallel-lines model as stated by the Brant’s test (33, 34), which
rejected the parallel regression assumption (Table 6).
TABLE 6 | Test of parallel regression assumption.
Chi2 df p > Chi2
Brant 44.21 14 0.000
Based on the existing literature, our knowledge of the Malian
context, and the use of a stepwise approach, the following
predictive variables were included:
– For the distance-effect-Distv: “Production system,” “Animal
species vaccinated,” “Mandataries are credible,” “Fairness of
PPR vaccine prices,” “Benefit awareness,” “Some vaccines
better than others,” “Cattle vaccination frequency.”
– For the quality-tracker effect-Qv: “Production system,”
“Animal species vaccinated,” “Mandataries are credible,”
“Fairness of PPR vaccine prices,” “Benefit awareness,” “Some
vaccines better than others,” “Cattle vaccination frequency,”
“Vaccination campaign participation.”
Finally, the regression was done successively on the distance-
effect (Distv) and the quality-effect (Qv).
For the Distance-Effect: Distv
Table 7 shows that, all other things being equal, farmers in
semi-intensive production systems, those who perceive that PPR
vaccine prices are fair, that vaccination is beneficial, including
the comparative advantage of PPR vaccines, are willing to pay a
premium if the physical access of vaccines is improved.
The regression analysis further reveals that the coefficients
for “Production system” and “Benefit awareness” do not vary
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 8 January 2020 | Volume 6 | Article 488
Wane et al. WTV and WTP in Mali
TABLE 7 | Regression analysis results for the distance-effect.
Dependent variable: Distance-Effect (WTP 0%, 5%, 10%, 20) Generalized ordered logit model
Distv = 0 Distv = 1 Distv = 2
Independent variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Livestock production system Extensive*
Semi-intensive −0.868 0.010 −0.868 0.010 −0.868 0.010
Intensive 0.074 0.952 0.073 0.952 0.074 0.952
Benefit of vaccination Yes*
No −1.925 0.007 −1.925 0.007 −1.925 0.007
Fairness of PPR vaccine prices Yes*
No −2.733 0.000 −2.151 0.000 −1.367 0.000
Some vaccines better than others Yes*
No −0.465 0.263 −1.059 0.003 −1.178 0.000
Constant 3.576 0.000 3.474 0.000 2.514 0.000
*Reference category.
across the categories of the response variable, i.e., the distance-
effect. This means “Production system” and “Benefit awareness”
have positive impacts on the distance-effect. Therefore, the more
the farmers in semi-intensive production system are aware of
the benefits of vaccination, the greater their willingness to pay
a premium for a shorter vaccine delivery distance.
These trends are visible only through sign and significance
at this stage. To improve the quality of interpretation of the
regression results (Table 8), we tabulate the marginal effects and
coefficients into odds ratios or conditional probabilities.
Farmers declare that they are willing to pay a higher price than
the current vaccine price if physical access to it is improved by a
significant reduction in the distance of supply and also if other
conditions are met. When farmers consider the price of PPR
vaccines to be fair, their probability of paying 20% more than the
current price of a vaccine dose increases by 73%. When they are
well aware of the beneficial effects of vaccination against PPR, the
probability increases by 71%.When farmers are in semi-intensive
production system, the probability of paying 20% more increases
by 65%. When they believe that some vaccines are better than
others, the probability increases by 61%.
For the Quality-Tracker Effect: Qv
WTP for improved quality tracking of PPR vaccines is
associated with the same significant variables: “Production
system,” “Benefit awareness of PPR vaccination,” “Fairness of
the PPR vaccine prices,” and “Comparative advantages of some
vaccines” (Table 9). When respondents indicate “No” to one or
more of these variables, this has a negative impact on WTP for a
vaccine-quality tracker. Thus, when a farmer is frustrated about
these variables (e.g., feels prices are not fair), it reduces their
willingness to pay a premium above the current vaccine prices
(Table 9).
If they are convinced that vaccine prices are fair, their
probability of paying 20% more on the current price of vaccines
increases by 77% (Table 10). In the same way, if they are aware
of the benefit of PPR vaccination, the probability for paying
the vaccines 20% more is 73% (Table 10). The practice of semi-
intensive production activities also leads them to an increase
in the probability of paying 20% more to 68% if the quality of
TABLE 8 | Marginal effects of the variables used in the model on distance
parameter.
Marginal
effects
t-
statistics
95% confidence
interval
Fairness of PPR vaccine prices
Pr(Distv = 0); independent variable = 1 0.076 0.000 0.043 0.109
Pr(Distv = 1); independent variable = 1 0.045 0.001 0.019 0.071
Pr(Distv = 2); independent variable = 1 0.144 0.000 0.102 0.186
Pr(Distv = 3); independent variable = 1 0.735 0.000 0.683 0.786
Benefit awareness
Pr(Distv = 0); independent variable = 1 0.127 0.000 0.093 0.162
Pr(Distv = 1); independent variable = 1 0.034 0.001 0.014 0.053
Pr(Distv = 2); independent variable = 1 0.131 0.000 0.093 0.168
Pr(Distv = 3); independent variable = 1 0.708 0.000 0.658 0.758
Production system
Pr(Distv = 0); independent variable = 2 0.167 0.000 0.126 0.208
Pr(Distv = 1); independent variable = 2 0.039 0.000 0.017 0.061
Pr(Distv = 2); independent variable = 2 0.143 0.000 0.102 0.184
Pr(Distv = 3); independent variable = 2 0.650 0.000 0.592 0.709
Some vaccines better than others
Pr(Distv = 0); independent variable = 2 0.155 0.000 0.109 0.202
Pr(Distv = 1); independent variable = 2 0.064 0.001 0.028 0.101
Pr(Distv = 2); independent variable = 2 0.172 0.000 0.117 0.226
Pr(Distv = 3); independent variable = 2 0.608 0.000 0.540 0.677
vaccines is improved. And finally, the awareness of farmers about
the relative comparative advantage of some vaccines increases
their probability of paying 20% more for vaccines than their
current prices by 82% (Table 10).
DISCUSSION
PPR is a concern for the Malian livestock sector where the
vaccination coverage is still very low. Although effective vaccines
are available, the disease remains endemic for various reasons.
Many of these reasons relate to the willingness of livestock
producers to vaccinate or to pay for vaccination. Our study
focused on socioeconomic factors influencing the WTV and
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TABLE 9 | Regression analysis results for the quality-effect.
Dependent variable: Quality-Effect (WTP 0%, 5%, 10%, 20) Generalized ordered logit model
Independent variables Qv = 0 Qv = 1 Qv = 2
Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic
Fairness of PPR vaccine prices Yes*
No −2.911 0.000 −2.592 0.000 −1.565 0.000
Benefit of vaccination Yes*
No −1.722 0.019 −1.722 0.019 −1.722 0.019
Some vaccines better than others Yes*
No −0.956 0.001 −0.956 0.001 −0.956 0.001
Participation to vaccination campaign Yes*
No 0.528 0.336 0.528 0.336 0.528 0.336
Livestock production system Extensive*
Semi-intensive −0.838 0.026 −0.838 0.026 −0.838 0.026
Intensive −0.214 0.858 −0.214 0.858 −0.214 0.858
Constant 4.018 0.000 3.592 0.000 2.458 0.000
*Reference category.
TABLE 10 | Marginal effects of the variables used in the model on quality
parameter.
Marginal
effects
t-
statistics
95% Confidence
Interval
Fairness of the PPR vaccine prices
Pr(qv = 0), Independent variable = 1 0.065 0.000 0.036 0.095
Pr(qv = 1), Independent variable = 1 0.030 0.004 0.010 0.050
Pr(qv = 2), Independent variable = 1 0.139 0.000 0.010 0.181
Pr(qv = 3), Independent variable = 1 0.765 0.000 0.715 0.815
Benefit awareness
Pr(qv = 0), Independent variable = 1 0.117 0.000 0.084 0.150
Pr(qv = 1), Independent variable = 1 0.029 0.002 0.010 0.047
Pr(qv = 2), Independent variable = 1 0.122 0.000 0.086 0.158
Pr(qv = 3), Independent variable = 1 0.733 0.000 0.684 0.781
Production system
Pr(qv = 0), Independent variable = 2 0.151 0.000 0.110 0.192
Pr(qv = 1), Independent variable = 2 0.033 0.002 0.012 0.054
Pr(qv = 2), Independent variable = 2 0.137 0.000 0.096 0.178
Pr(qv = 3), Independent variable = 2 0.679 0.000 0.619 0.739
Some vaccines more important than others
Pr(qv = 0), Independent variable = 1 0.081 0.000 0.046 0.116
Pr(qv = 1), Independent variable = 1 0.018 0.008 0.005 0.031
Pr(qv = 2), Independent variable = 1 0.083 0.000 0.047 0.119
Pr(qv = 3), Independent variable = 1 0.818 0.000 0.751 0.885
WTP for vaccines against PPR in Sikasso and Mopti regions
in Mali. The study led to interesting findings which highlight a
number of important policy implications.
First, the place and function of beliefs in the decision-
making process are often neglected, even though they can validly
be the result of rational behavior. Vaccination programmes
against animal diseases are mostly evaluated by using availability
and access to vaccines. Although these two elements are
very important, it appears that farmer beliefs associated with
their participation in vaccination programmes are crucial to
understand their decision-making process to vaccinate or pay
for vaccination (26–30). The challenge of considering farmer
beliefs and perceptions about vaccination is to better understand
their behavior, but also to develop appropriate policy instruments
to increase their participation in vaccination campaigns and
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of voluntary vaccination
strategies (26). Our study places greater emphasis on the behavior
of farmers and shows that their decisions are based on their
perceptions of the characteristics and effects of vaccination
against PPR.
Second, market orientation (semi-intensive production) plays
an important role in the willingness to pay for vaccination.
The use of fattening operations, while still maintaining some
flexibility for animal mobility, suggests a stronger market
orientation compared to the extensive system. Vaccination, even
when paid for, appears to be a part of this strategy, more than in
other production systems.
Third, our results show that making information on
vaccination campaigns more accessible and livestock producers
more aware of the benefits of vaccines, may change their
WTV and WTP. This requires working both on the content
and form of information dissemination. The information
must go beyond simply informing livestock producers
about the dates and periods of vaccination campaigns.
Rather, such information needs to effectively communicate
the positive role of vaccines in the control of animal
diseases; on their protective effects on the herd and those
of neighbors; and their potential side effects, whether positive
or negative.
Dissemination of information through different media, such
as places of worship, communal radio stations, mouth-to-mouth,
etc. have proven to be somewhat effective, though future research
must accurately assess these platforms in greater depth. All these
media require physical access while there are great opportunities
to expand information access through innovative ways with
the growing accessibility of internet-based web applications and
mobile phones in this country.
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Fourth, the results highlight the negative impact of livestock
farmers’ perceptions about inequity of vaccine prices. Our
study does not directly show this; however, discussions we
had after the study indicate that farmers seem to perceive
differentiated (and unfair) vaccine pricing between cattle and SR
that does not consider the differences in size and value of each
species. This involves trade-off behaviors between vaccinating
cattle and small ruminants. They do not seem to be aware
of the costs of producing and deploying the vaccines to be
considered. Therefore, the Malian authorities might benefit from
including greater price transparency throughout the vaccine
production and deployment chain by facilitating an equal access
to and greater clarity about price information. For instance,
enhanced communication about the subsidies supported by
Malian authorities could help in this transparency.
Fifth, regarding farmers’ trust of private veterinarians, the
FTF-MLTS program took an important step to address this
lack of trust through better planning of vaccination campaigns
using participatory approaches vaccination delivery through
Innovation Platforms (IPs). Preliminary results show that IPs
have been able to strengthen trust between farmers and
private veterinarians, consequently improving performance of
vaccination campaigns (9).
Finally, results of our model clearly suggest that distance
and quality perceptions are critical issues underpinning farmer
willingness to pay for improved vaccines. Developing logistical
support and efficient supply chains that improve access to
vaccines in a timely manner is critical. Porphyre et al. (35)
showed that the initial availability of vaccine stock at the
start of an outbreak significantly contributes to optimal control
strategies for disease outbreaks. Therefore, development of basic
infrastructure and control of the cold chain are critical in the
implementation of optimal health delivery systems. This can
explain the respondents’ desire and WTP for a test that shows
them whether a vaccine is viable.
The main limitation of this study is intrinsically linked to the
inaccessibility of some areas due to the security problems that
have characterized the country for more than a decade. This
security situation is even more tense in the livestock areas in
particular fromMopti region to the extreme Northern part of the
country. Thus, the sampling of households to be surveyed was
carried out only in accessible areas, particularly those targeted by
the FTF-MLTS program. Based on our survey results, this area’s
PPR vaccination participation rates (89% during and 39% outside
of campaigns), seem relatively high compared to estimates of the
country’s overall PPR vaccination coverage of 7%. Therefore, our
survey sample and results might not reflect all relevant drivers of
WTV or WTP for livestock farmers throughout the country.
Another limitation is that dichotomous and polychotomous
categorial variables were used with two or more categories or
levels. Responses from livestock producers can be too narrow in
relation to the question, such that they create or magnify bias
that is not factored into the survey. For instance, on the question
about satisfaction with vaccines, people might be satisfied with
the intrinsic quality of vaccines but upset about the behavior of
vaccinators. Combining our approach with a more quantitative
approach on the household economics allowing to collect data
related to household income, expenditures and budgets might
help to refine further the analysis. In addition, a qualitative
approach (e.g., open-ended interviews) could also help to clarify
some of the producers’ responses.
CONCLUSION
This study focused on livestock farmers’ attitudes and behaviors
around vaccination, identifying socioeconomic factors that are
associated with WTV animals and WTP for vaccination. These
factors could be effectively managed by improving information
on the benefits of vaccination, confidence in the viability of
vaccines upon arrival at producers’ herds, the qualifications
of private veterinarians in charge of vaccination, vaccine
pricing transparency, and improved information sharing about
vaccination campaigns.
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